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DEFINING NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC 
RECORDS AND OPEN MEETINGS FEE-
SHIFTING PROVISIONS IN THE LARGER 
NATIONAL CONTEXT* 
ELLIOT ENGSTROM** 
North Carolina’s Public Records and Open Meetings laws both 
provide for awards of attorney’s fees in certain situations. The 
Public Records law awards fees to a plaintiff who “substantially 
prevails” and a government defendant who is sued in bad faith 
or on a frivolous basis. The Open Meetings law awards fees to 
any party that “prevails.” These fee awards act as an incentive 
(or disincentive) for litigants to pursue these “open government” 
cases. Such awards are the exception to the general North 
Carolina rule that a party bears the burden of paying its own 
attorney’s fees. 
 
There is very limited appellate case law interpreting when a party 
should receive such an award of attorney’s fees. This limited case 
law is exacerbated by the recent modification of the plaintiffs’ 
fee-shifting provision in the Public Records law. 
 
While appellate treatment of this issue is limited, there is a larger 
body of trial court decisions and persuasive case law on point. 
There are also materially similar fee-shifting provisions 
elsewhere in the North Carolina General Statutes that can 
provide guidance on how North Carolina courts treat fee 
shifting. This Article examines these and other sources in pursuit 
of a better understanding of when a plaintiff or defendant in an 
open government case might expect to receive an award of 
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attorney’s fees and, when appropriate, makes recommendations 
about how courts and practitioners should treat these provisions 
moving forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorize an 
“award of costs” to a party where a court finds such an award to be 
“equitable and just.”1 However, this award of costs does not include 
attorney’s fees.2 The rule in North Carolina is that a party may only 
recover attorney’s fees “when authorized by statute.”3 The only 
exception that spans across most subject matter is the court’s 
discretionary power to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 
prevailing party” in a case where the losing party fails to raise “a 
justiciable issue of either law or fact . . . in any pleading.”4 Other 
statutory awards of attorney’s fees tend to be narrow in scope.5 Two 
of these narrower exceptions are found in North Carolina’s open 
government laws. 
North Carolina has two open government laws. The first is the 
Public Records Act, which provides for access to state and municipal 
government records.6 The second is the Open Meetings law, which, 
with limited exceptions, requires that public bodies meet in the open 
and provides a cause of action to challenge violations.7 Nearly every 
 
 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-263 (2017). 
 2. Swaps, LLC v. ASL Props., Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 791 S.E.2d 711, 712 (2016) 
(“Here, the General Assembly chose only to refer to ‘costs’ in Section 1-263 and not to 
specify that the term costs includes attorneys’ fees. Thus, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
263 does not permit the trial court to award attorneys’ fees.”). 
 3. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 281, 679 S.E.2d 512, 518 
(2009). 
 4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 (2017). 
 5. See, e.g., id. § 6-21.1(a) (allowing attorney’s fees as part of costs in certain cases 
involving personal injury or property damage); id. § 6-19.1(a) (allowing a party defending 
against or appealing an agency decision to recover its attorney’s fees where it prevails 
against the State); cf. Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 
1989) (“The private attorney general doctrine is an equitable rule which permits courts in 
their discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party who has vindicated a right that: (1) 
benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is of societal 
importance.”). 
 6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -11 (2017). 
 7. Id. §§ 143-318.9 to -318.18. 
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state provides for some form of fee shifting in its Public Records and 
Open Meetings laws.8 Such fee awards serve as an incentive for 
members of the public to keep governments open and accountable.9 
These awards can amount to thousands or even tens of thousands of 
dollars.10 They are distinct from attorney’s fees awarded as part of a 
sanction against a party bringing suit for an improper purpose.11 
The goal of this research is to give definition to when a plaintiff 
or defendant might receive attorney’s fees under North Carolina’s 
Public Records or Open Meetings laws. While this research does 
provide persuasive examples from federal courts and other states, 
these examples are not intended to serve as an exhaustive survey of 
fee shifting across jurisdictions. Rather, these examples have been 
selected from jurisdictions that have materially similar provisions to 
those of North Carolina. 
While this Article does not achieve absolute clarity as to the 
meaning of these provisions, it does provide useful guidance for 
litigants and judges who must deal with awards of attorney’s fees 
under these open government provisions. As to North Carolina’s 
Public Records Act, it seems likely that the State’s courts will 
eventually have to decide how to interpret the plaintiff’s fee-shifting 
provision in light of competing persuasive frameworks. Different 
jurisdictions have interpreted similar language in very different ways, 
giving North Carolina courts various examples to follow. Further, 
North Carolina Public Records defendants should rarely, if ever, 
expect to receive a fee award except when faced with the most 
egregious conduct by plaintiffs. 
 
 8. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.E. 
 9. See, e.g., Cmty. Youth Athletic Ctr. v. City of Nat’l City, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 694 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“Indeed, the very purpose of the attorney fees provision is to 
provide ‘protections and incentives for members of the public to seek judicial enforcement 
of their right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.’” (quoting Galbiso v. Orosi 
Pub. Util. Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))); see also Frankel v. D.C. 
Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015) (noting that the threat of 
having to pay a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees can incentivize agencies to respond to public 
records requests). 
 10. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., No. 06-CVS-106, 
2009 WL 8660508, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009) (awarding a plaintiff $17,500 in an 
Open Meetings lawsuit), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 206 N.C. App. 192, 696 S.E.2d 559 
(2010); Lothrop v. Chatham Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 06-CVS-239, 2006 WL 4526077, at 
*6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2006) (awarding a plaintiff $3,500 in attorney’s fees for a 
partial Open Meetings victory); see also Wolf v. Grubbs, 759 N.W.2d 499, 529 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2009) (awarding appellees $17,457.46 in an action for Open Meetings Act violations). 
 11. See, e.g., Davis v. Durham Cty. Area Mental Health, No. 02-CVS-02211, 2002 WL 
34202184, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2002). 
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Regarding the Open Meetings law, it could at first be 
discouraging to see that the number of times North Carolina’s 
appellate courts have interpreted the fee-shifting provision can be 
counted on one hand. However, these courts have made clear that 
they put a great amount of weight on persuasive authority from 
jurisdictions like the Fourth Circuit that already have a great wealth 
of case law on hand.12 Courts and practitioners interpreting this 
provision, therefore, have substantially more material to work with 
than initially meets the eye. 
I.  FEE AWARDS UNDER THE NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC RECORDS 
ACT 
The North Carolina Public Records Act (“NCPRA”) is codified 
at section 132 of the General Statutes of North Carolina.13 It is North 
Carolina’s state-level corollary to the federal Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”).14 The statutory scheme provides for a broad policy 
allowing “the people [to] obtain copies of their public records and 
public information free or at minimal cost unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law.”15 Therefore, “any person” may examine 
and copy public records upon request.16 A given record could 
potentially be partially public and partially confidential, and in such 
situations a government agency may not use this as a justification for 
denying access to public records.17 Any person who is denied access to 
public records may file suit in the General Court of Justice “for an 
order compelling disclosure or copying.”18 It is in such actions that the 
questions surrounding fee awards are raised. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App. 
192, 203, 696 S.E.2d 559, 567 (2010) (quoting Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 318 
(4th Cir. 2008)); H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 
49, 57, 468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 340, 350, 352 (4th 
Cir. 1980)). 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -11 (2017). 
 14. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (2017). 
 16. Id. § 132-6(a). 
 17. See id. § 132-6(c) (“No request to inspect, examine, or obtain copies of public 
records shall be denied on the grounds that confidential information is commingled with 
the requested nonconfidential information. If it is necessary to separate confidential from 
nonconfidential information in order to permit the inspection, examination, or copying of 
the public records, the public agency shall bear the cost of such separation.”). 
 18. Id. § 132-9(a). 
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A. The NCPRA provides for fee awards to plaintiffs who 
“substantially prevail,” but the meaning of this language is less 
than clear. 
A North Carolina plaintiff who “successfully compels” 
production of public records shall “recover its reasonable attorneys’ 
fees if attributed to those public records” if the plaintiff “substantially 
prevails.”19 The award is mandatory rather than discretionary.20 
However, a court may not assess attorney’s fees against a 
governmental entity where, in denying access to records, the agency 
relied on a judgment or order “applicable to the governmental unit or 
governmental body.”21 Further, fees may not be assessed where the 
governmental entity relied on “[t]he published opinion of an 
appellate court, an order of the North Carolina Business Court, . . . a 
final order of the Trial Division of the General Court of Justice,” or 
“[a] written opinion, decision, or letter of the Attorney General.”22 
Prior to the addition of this more specific “substantially prevails” 
language in 2010, a governmental defendant could avoid a fee award 
if it “acted with substantial justification in denying access” to 
records.23 If the presiding court finds that the entity “acted in 
reasonable reliance,” the court is prohibited from assessing attorney’s 
fees against the entity.24 North Carolina shares this concept with 
Massachusetts and Texas.25 
 
 19. Id. § 132-9(c). 
 20. See id.; cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005 (2017) (“The court may award 
attorney fees and costs to a successful plaintiff of any action brought under this section, 
but only if the court finds that the action was frivolous or was brought solely for the 
purpose of harassment.” (emphasis added)). 
 21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c)(1) (2017). 
 22. Id. § 132-9(c)(2)–(3). 
 23. Act of June 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9(c), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)). 
 24. See id.; see, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Tillet v. Town of Kill Devil 
Hills, __ N.C. App. __, 809 S.E.2d 145 (2017) (No. COA 17-433) (“Defendant cited 
numerous Court of Appeals opinions . . . standing for the proposition that documents 
involving personnel matters and criminal investigative materials are not a matter of public 
record.”). 
 25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10A(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through ch. 63 of 
2018 Second Ann. Sess.) (“There shall be a presumption in favor of an award of fees and 
costs unless the agency or municipality establishes that . . . the agency or municipality 
reasonably relied upon a published opinion of an appellate court of the commonwealth 
based on substantially similar facts.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred by a plaintiff who substantially prevails, except that the 
court may not assess those costs and fees against a governmental body if the court finds 
that the governmental body acted in reasonable reliance on . . . the published opinion of 
an appellate court . . . .”). 
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Prior to the 2010 amendment, the statute merely awarded 
attorney’s fees to a “prevailing” plaintiff.26 The summary of ratified 
legislation for 2010 simply notes that the fee award is mandatory, but 
does not mention the change in language from “prevailing party” to 
“substantially prevails.”27 It is probable that the legislature would not 
have changed the words of the statute if it did not intend to change its 
meaning.28 However, it is not immediately clear what it means for a 
plaintiff to “substantially prevail” versus merely “prevail,” as both 
terms are used in different areas of the General Statutes.29 The 
potential for ambiguity is increased by the possibility that a given 
record might be partially confidential and partially public.30 
While there is no legislative history indicating what the General 
Assembly intended when it changed the wording from “prevailing 
party” to “substantially prevails,” it certainly cannot be a coincidence 
that the 2010 amendment makes the North Carolina fee provision 
nearly identical to its Texas counterpart.31 The Texas “substantially 
 
 26. Act of June 10, 2010, sec. 21(c), § 132-9(c), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 660. 
 27. RESEARCH DIV. OF THE N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SUMMARIES OF SUBSTANTIVE 
RATIFIED LEGISLATION 26 (2010) (noting that where a party “successfully compels the 
disclosure of public records, the court must allow that party to recover its reasonable 
attorneys’ fees”). 
 28. See State v. Davis, 198 N.C. App. 443, 452, 680 S.E.2d 239, 246 (2009) (“[I]n 
construing a statute that has been repealed or amended, it may be presumed that the 
legislature intended either to change the substance of the original act or to clarify the 
meaning of the statute.” (quoting State v. Bright, 135 N.C. App. 381, 383, 520 S.E.2d 138, 
139 (1999))). But see Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 21 n.3, 727 S.E.2d 675, 688 
n.3 (2012) (“Whereas it is logical to conclude that an amendment to an unambiguous 
statute indicates the intent to change the law, no such inference arises when the legislature 
amends an ambiguous provision.” (quoting Childers v. Parker’s, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 
162 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1968))). 
 29. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 (2017) (awarding attorney’s fees to a “prevailing 
party” in nonjusticiable cases); see also id. § 44A-35 (allowing attorney’s fees for a 
“prevailing party” in certain cases involving statutory liens); id. § 113-391.1(e)(3) 
(providing that a party who “substantially prevails” in compelling disclosure of 
information that was alleged to have been a trade secret by another party “shall . . . 
recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees if attributed to that information”). 
 30. Section 132-6(c) prohibits a public entity from denying access to public 
information on the grounds that it is commingled with confidential information. However, 
this does not resolve whether a plaintiff who compels production of only a portion of a 
record may be considered to have “substantially” prevailed. Id. § 132-6(c). 
 31. Compare Act of July 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 
638, 660 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)) (directing a court to allow a party 
who substantially prevails in an action to compel disclosure of public information to 
recover of its reasonable attorney’s fees), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“In an action brought under Section 552.321 or 
552.3215, the court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by 
a plaintiff who substantially prevails, except that the court may not assess those costs and 
fees against a governmental body if the court finds that the governmental body acted in 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018) 
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prevails” standard was initially enacted in 1993 as part of a larger 
legislative package that the Texas legislature deemed 
“nonsubstantive.”32 In 1999, a decade before the North Carolina 
amendment, the provision went through its largest change, which 
mirrors today’s North Carolina statute.33 While this might be a reason 
for North Carolina courts to look to Texas case law for guidance, they 
are by no means bound to do so.34 
The fee award to a substantially prevailing plaintiff is mandatory, 
as is the prohibition on such an award where the governmental 
defendant reasonably relied on one of the listed authorities in 
denying access to public records.35 This mandatory fee award leaves 
no room for judicial discretion, meaning that whether a plaintiff has 
substantially prevailed is purely a question of law.36 However, the 
definition of when a plaintiff has substantially prevailed is up for 
judicial interpretation. The words of a statute must first and foremost 
be given their ordinary meaning.37 However, where a statute is 
ambiguous, a court may construe the statute to “ascertain the 
legislative will.”38 The phrase “substantially prevail” is ambiguous 
because it is “fairly susceptible of two or more meanings.”39 The 
mandatory nature of the fee award and ambiguity of the standard 
leave a prominent role for case law in determining when plaintiffs 
substantially prevail in North Carolina Public Records suits. 
While North Carolina appellate case law provides some insight 
into defining when a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, there are 
limits to its usefulness. The most obvious limitation is timing—the 
 
reasonable reliance on: (1) a judgment or an order of a court applicable to the 
governmental body; (2) the published opinion of an appellate court; or (3) a written 
decision of the attorney general, including a decision issued under Subchapter G or an 
opinion issued under Section 402.042.”). 
 32. Act of May 22, 1993, ch. 268, sec. 1, § 552.323, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 583, 606 
(codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)). 
 33. See Act of June 18, 1999, ch. 1319, sec. 28, § 552.323, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4500, 
4512 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017). 
 34. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.C. 
 35. § 132-9(c). 
 36. Cathey v. Cathey, 210 N.C. App. 230, 231–32, 707 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2011) 
(“Questions of statutory interpretation are ultimately questions of law for the courts and 
are reviewed de novo.” (quoting In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 
612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009))). 
 37. Abernethy v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Pitt Cty., 169 N.C. 631, 635, 86 S.E. 577, 579 
(1915). 
 38. Purcell v. Friday Staffing, 235 N.C. App. 342, 347, 761 S.E.2d 694, 698 (2014) 
(quoting State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005)). 
 39. Abernethy, 169 N.C. at 636, 86 S.E.2d at 580. 
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legislature only recently amended the NCPRA to its current 
“substantially prevails” framework.40 This leads to problems for 
current practitioners, as any cases decided under the previous 
framework were interpreting different statutory language. 
Even prior to 2010, the only relevant North Carolina appellate 
law directly interpreting the plaintiff’s fee provision of the NCPRA 
was North Carolina Press Association v. Spangler.41 There, the 
defendant, the President of the University of North Carolina, claimed 
that despite the trial court’s order to release records, their release was 
actually the result of an internal decision.42 The defendant went on to 
argue that “petitioners cannot be a prevailing party” because “the 
documents were released as a consequence of a decision made prior 
to the lawsuit, not as a consequence of the lawsuit.”43 In an attempt to 
harmonize federal case law as it stood at the time with that of North 
Carolina, the defendant claimed that “the moving party has the 
burden of showing that the lawsuit caused the agency to release the 
documents.”44 
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s attempt to 
harmonize state and federal law, reasoning that FOIA contained 
“language substantially different from [the North Carolina] Public 
Records Act.”45 The court found that, due to this difference, the 
federal case law was “not persuasive.”46 Therefore, the Spangler court 
drew a stark line between the fee provisions of the NCPRA and its 
federal counterpart as they existed in 1989. Were the text of the 
statutes today the same as in the past, this stark line would likely still 
 
 40. See Act of July 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)). 
 41. 94 N.C. App. 694, 381 S.E.2d 187 (1989). 
 42. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“Here petitioners obtained an Order from the trial 
court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination and 
copying. That respondents were able to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending 
appeal does not alter the fact that petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”). 
 43. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 189–90. 
 44. Brief of Appellant at 10, N.C. Press Ass’n. v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 381 
S.E.2d 187 (1989) (No. 8810 SC 1004) [hereinafter Spangler Brief] (citing Vt. Low Income 
Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting the attorney’s 
fees provision of the Freedom of Information Act), abrogated by Union of Needletrades, 
Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336 
F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 45. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190. 
 46. Id.; cf. Capitol Info. Ass’n v. Ann Arbor Police, 360 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“Federal cases dealing with the analogous federal statute are highly 
persuasive in construing Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act.”). 
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be in effect as stare decisis.47 However, both provisions contained 
different text at that point in time than they do today. 
In 1989, FOIA provided courts with the discretionary power to 
award a plaintiff its “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation 
costs” where it had “substantially prevailed.”48 The statute provided 
no further guidance on what these words meant.49 At the same time, 
the NCPRA’s fee provision was split between two statutes. The 
relevant provision of the NCPRA provided a cause of action for 
access to public records.50 Another statute then gave courts the power 
to award “reasonable attorney’s fees” in “any civil action in which a 
party successfully [compelled] the disclosure of public records 
pursuant to” that cause of action.51 However, such awards were only 
allowed where the governmental defendant “acted without 
substantial justification in denying access to the public records” and 
where there were “no special circumstances that would make the 
award of fees unjust.”52 
The defendant in Spangler argued that in order to be a prevailing 
party under the NCPRA, the plaintiff’s lawsuit “not only must have 
induced the disclosure of the records, but must have been necessary to 
induce such disclosure.”53 There was some question as to whether this 
was a correct statement of the rule to which the defendant cited.54 
 
 47. See, e.g., Musi v. Town of Shallotte, 200 N.C. App. 379, 383, 684 S.E.2d 892, 896 
(2009) (“The judicial policy of stare decisis is followed by the courts of this state. Under 
this doctrine, ‘[t]he determination of a point of law by a court will generally be followed by 
a court of the same or lower rank[.]’” (quoting Dunn v. Pate, 106 N.C. App. 56, 60, 415 
S.E.2d 102, 104 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178 
(1993))). 
 48. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 1, § 552(a)(4)(E), 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 
(1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012)). 
 49. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (providing that a plaintiff substantially 
prevails where it obtains relief through either “a judicial order, or an enforceable written 
agreement or consent decree,” or “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the 
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial”). 
 50. Act of June 24, 1975, ch. 787, § 3, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1112, 1113 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (2017)). 
 51. Act of July 22, 1983, ch. 918, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 1266, 1266, repealed by Act 
of July 10, 1995, ch. 388, sec. 6, § 6-19.2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 949, 954.  
 52. Id. at 1267. 
 53. Spangler Brief, supra note 44, at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Vt. Low Income 
Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1976), abrogated by Union of 
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 54. The defendant in Spangler cited the federal rule as stating that a plaintiff’s lawsuit 
“must have been necessary to induce” the disclosure of records. Id. However, the case to 
which the defendant cited states that “[i]n order to obtain an award of attorney fees in an 
FOIA action, a plaintiff must show at minimum that the prosecution of the action could 
reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the action had substantial causative 
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Regardless, the Court of Appeals found that the “successfully 
compelled” language of the NCPRA as it existed in 1989 presented a 
more plaintiff-friendly standard than the “substantially prevails” 
language of FOIA as it existed at that same time.55 
Despite the fact that the court declined to follow FOIA, Spangler 
still contains several propositions which could likely be useful in 
North Carolina Public Records litigation.56 The Court of Appeals 
simply declined to consider federal case law as persuasive where the 
federal language was “substantially different” from the controlling 
state statute.57 Implicit in this statement, though, is the idea that 
where statutes contain language similar to that found in the NCPRA, 
the statutes and their interpreting case law could be persuasive.58 This 
implicit statement may now be of some use given that the current 
FOIA fee provision is similar to North Carolina’s current fee 
provision.59 
The federal FOIA provides for a discretionary award of fees 
where a plaintiff “has substantially prevailed,”60 but that provision 
then goes on to provide further definition.61 The provision is 
 
effect on the delivery of the information. Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 
F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added), abrogated by Union of Needletrades, 
Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336 
F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 55. N.C. Press Ass’n v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 696–97, 381 S.E.2d 187, 189–90 
(“Respondents cite several federal cases for the proposition that petitioners have the 
burden of showing that their lawsuit caused the agency to release the documents . . . . The 
cases that respondents cite interpret the Federal Freedom of Information Act which 
contains language substantially different from our Public Records Act. The cases are not 
persuasive here.”). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 698–99, 381 S.E.2d at 191 (“[T]he Public Records Act does not give 
a governmental agency the discretionary authority to decline to comply with an order for 
release of records to the public until a time when the agency has determined that release 
would be prudent or timely.”); id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“That respondents were able 
to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending appeal does not alter the fact that 
petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”). 
 57. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190. 
 58. See, e.g., H.B.S Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 
49, 57, 468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (interpreting North Carolina statutory language allowing 
a “prevailing party” its reasonable attorneys’ fees in light of the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of a similar federal provision granting reasonable attorney’s fees to a 
prevailing party (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 340, 350, 352 (4th Cir. 1980))).  
 59. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (allowing a court to assess reasonable 
attorneys fees in favor of a party who “has substantially prevailed”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 132-9(c) (2017) (allowing a party who “substantially prevails” in an action to compel 
disclosure of public information to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees). 
 60. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). 
 61. It provides as follows: 
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therefore similar, though not identical, to its North Carolina 
counterpart. Thus, the Spangler court’s rejection of federal case law 
as a persuasive source is likely no longer binding on North Carolina 
courts, for the simple reason that, under the modern, more similarly 
worded state and federal statutes, the court’s reasoning no longer 
holds. Case law interpreting the federal provision is likely now 
persuasive in North Carolina.62 
While less informative, an example of when a plaintiff 
substantially prevails in a Public Records action can be garnered from 
Wilson v. North Carolina Department of Commerce.63 There, the 
plaintiff alleged that the North Carolina Department of Commerce 
was illegally withholding access to public notices.64 The case was 
initially filed on February 18, 2014.65 The trial court quickly granted 
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction compelling 
disclosure of unemployment hearing notices as public records.66 The 
defendant appealed, but before the court of appeals could hear the 
case, the General Assembly amended the relevant statute to make 
confidential the information sought by the plaintiff.67 
The court of appeals held that the legislative amendment did not 
moot the appeal because it did not “provide plaintiffs the relief they 
sought: compelled disclosure of the hearing notices prior to the 
August 2014 amendment and attorneys’ fees for enforcing that 
right.”68 Therefore, even after the August 2014 amendment, the 
plaintiffs still could have, in theory, substantially prevailed for the 
purposes of receiving an award of attorney’s fees. However, there 
would still be one more hurdle for the plaintiffs, who would have to 
show that the August 2014 amendment was “substantive” rather than 
 
For purposes of this subparagraph, a complainant has substantially prevailed if the 
complainant has obtained relief through either– 
(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or 
(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s 
claim is not insubstantial. 
Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). 
 62. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 63. 239 N.C. App. 456, 768 S.E.2d 360 (2015). 
 64. Complaint at 2, Wilson v. N.C. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 14-CVS-2499 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2014). 
 65. Id. at 1. 
 66. Wilson v. N.C. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 14-CVS-2499 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 
2014) (granting preliminary injunction). 
 67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(x) (2017) (“Confidential information is exempt from the 
public records disclosure requirements of Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.”). 
 68. Wilson, 239 N.C. App. at 461, 768 S.E.2d at 364. 
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“clarifying.”69 The substantive versus clarifying framework would 
essentially decide whether the General Assembly’s amendment 
retroactively applied to records requested by the plaintiff. In other 
words, the General Assembly has the power to clarify the public or 
confidential nature of a given record, and in this way throw an 
insurmountable wrench into a plaintiff’s action and request for fees 
under the NCPRA.70 
One other North Carolina statute to which courts may look for 
guidance is the North Carolina Oil and Gas Conservation Act.71 That 
Act provides that a party who “substantially prevails” in compelling 
disclosure of information that was alleged to have been a trade secret 
by another party “shall . . . recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees.”72 
The General Assembly only added the language in June 2014, and it 
has yet to receive any appellate treatment.73 However, future 
appellate treatment of when a plaintiff substantially prevails in that 
context could be persuasive for the Public Records provision. 
The myriad of interpretive tools could be cast aside if the North 
Carolina appellate courts were given the opportunity to construe the 
fee provisions of the Public Records law. However, until that time 
comes, practitioners and courts will have to look to persuasive sources 
for guidance. 
B. While there is a large body of persuasive case law determining 
whether a Public Records plaintiff has “substantially prevailed,” 
the treatment of this language is not uniform across jurisdictions. 
1.  There is a large body of federal case law demonstrating when 
parties “substantially prevail” under a “catalyst” framework. 
Where North Carolina appellate courts have not established 
sufficient precedent on an issue, they will turn to “federal decisions 
and opinions drafted by other jurisdictions.”74 Decisions by federal 
courts construing constitutional or statutory language do not control 
 
 69. Id. (citing Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 9, 727 S.E.2d 675, 682 (2012) 
(noting that clarifying amendments apply to cases brought after the statute’s effective 
dates and to cases pending before the courts when the amendment is adopted, while 
substantive amendments apply when from the time of the effective date)). 
 70. Id. at 464, 768 S.E.2d at 366. 
 71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-391.1 (2017). 
 72. Id. § 113-391.1(e)(3). 
 73. Act of May 29, 2014, ch. 4, § 8(a), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 57, 66 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 113-391.1 (2017)). 
 74. Brown v. Centex Homes, 171 N.C. App. 742, 744, 615 S.E.2d 86, 88 (2005). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018) 
1738 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
the interpretations of similar language by North Carolina courts, but 
they are persuasive.75 
The FOIA fee-shifting provision explains that a court “may” 
award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who “has substantially 
prevailed.”76 The statute goes on to define that a plaintiff “has 
substantially prevailed” where it “has obtained relief” through either 
“a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent 
decree” or “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the 
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”77 This 
amendment, which was passed as part of the Open Government Act 
of 2007, embodies a “catalyst theory,” under which a plaintiff who 
“obtains relief via a voluntary or unilateral change in position by” a 
governmental defendant has “substantially prevailed.”78 This is 
similar, though not identical, to the language of the North Carolina 
provision, which provides for a mandatory award of fees to a plaintiff 
who “substantially prevails,” but provides no further definition.79 
In order to make accurate comparisons between the NCPRA 
and FOIA, it is critical to first understand the difference between 
eligibility and entitlement in the federal FOIA scheme. Federal courts 
first look to whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, and is 
therefore eligible for attorney’s fees, and only then do they proceed 
to decide whether an eligible plaintiff is entitled to a fee award.80 This 
 
 75. McNeill v. Harnett Cty., 327 N.C. 552, 563, 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990) (“Decisions 
by the federal courts . . . although persuasive, do not control an interpretation by this 
Court of the law of the land clause in our state Constitution.”). 
 76. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012). 
 77. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). 
 78. Wildlands CPR v. U.S. Forest Serv., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (D. Mont. 2008) 
(citing § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)) (“The Act thus . . . revived the catalyst theory, i.e., where a 
complainant obtains relief via a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, 
the complainant has substantially prevailed and is eligible for attorney fees.”); see also 
Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015) (noting 
that “Congress acted to ‘clarif[y] that the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon . . . 
does not apply to [federal] FOIA cases’” (quoting 153 CONG. REC. S15,831 (daily ed. Dec. 
18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy))). 
 79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017). 
 80. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (“A determination of eligibility does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to 
attorney’s fees. Entitlement to attorney’s fees is left to the discretion of the district 
court.”) (citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by First Amendment Coal. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 869 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2017); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 
Wash. v. FEC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In this Circuit, the attorney-fee 
inquiry is divided into two prongs, the fee ‘eligibility’ and the fee ‘entitlement’ prongs.” 
(citing Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 
2011))); Matlack, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 868 F. Supp. 627, 630 (D. Del. 1994) 
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entitlement analysis does not occur in North Carolina because once a 
court determines that a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, the award 
of fees is mandatory.81 Therefore, federal case law is only useful as 
persuasive authority in North Carolina to the extent that it provides a 
framework for determining whether a plaintiff has substantially 
prevailed.82 
In the federal framework, the most straightforward cases are 
those in which a court orders a FOIA defendant to produce records.83 
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff 
could not be considered a prevailing party without obtaining some 
sort of judicial relief.84 However, “Congress amended the statute to 
encompass” a “catalyst theory,” which allows a plaintiff to recover its 
 
(providing a straightforward framework of the two-prong eligibility and entitlement 
analysis under the federal Freedom of Information Act). 
 81. § 132-9(c) (providing that a party that “successfully compels the disclosure of 
public records . . . shall” be allowed to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees (emphasis 
added)). 
 82. The eligibility analysis may be useful in providing a model of how to treat pro se 
litigants. The United States Supreme Court has generally found that individual pro se 
plaintiffs are not eligible for fee awards even if they are themselves practicing attorneys. 
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (“A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to 
pro se litigants—even if limited to those who are members of the bar—would create a 
disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to 
litigate on his own behalf.”); see Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473 
F.3d 312, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that Baker Hostetler is eligible for 
attorney’s fees because of (i) the plain text of the statute and (ii) the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kay v. Ehrler . . . particularly footnote 7 of that opinion. We note, moreover, 
that the two other Court of Appeals panels to consider the issue after Kay each 
unanimously concluded that a law firm representing itself is eligible for attorney’s fees.”); 
see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., PUBLIC INFORMATION HANDBOOK 63 
(2016). However, law firms representing themselves have been allowed to recover their 
reasonable attorney’s fees in some circuits. Cf. Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap PC v. 
Boyce Trust 2350, 870 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Mich. 2015) (holding that legal services 
performed for a law firm by its member lawyers “cannot . . . give rise to an ‘attorney fee’”). 
This threshold determination does not go to whether the plaintiff substantially prevailed in 
its suit, but rather determines whether a substantially prevailing plaintiff is eligible for an 
award of attorney’s fees. Baker & Hostetler, 473 F.3d at 326 (noting that a law firm is 
eligible for an award of attorney’s fees and remanding to the trial court to determine 
whether the law firm “substantially prevailed” and is entitled to fees). 
 83. See, e.g., Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. FDA, 511 F.3d 187, 195 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is clear that a court order requiring a recalcitrant agency to release 
documents pursuant to the legal mandate of FOIA is sufficient to render the plaintiff a 
prevailing party.”). 
 84. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 31, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 
sec. 4, § 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2525, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (2012)). 
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fees where it is “the catalyst for change,” even if it does not obtain a 
favorable judgment.85 
While some cases do involve judicial relief on the merits, many 
situations are not so straightforward, such as those involving joint 
stipulations, scheduling orders, settlement agreements, or disclosure 
by defendants prior to judicial action. But federal courts have 
provided guidance on when a plaintiff in such situations substantially 
prevails under a catalyst framework. For example, where, after filing 
suit, a plaintiff and defendant jointly stipulated to production of the 
disputed records at a future date, a federal court of appeals found that 
judicial approval of the joint stipulation made the plaintiff a 
substantially prevailing party.86 The court reasoned that, much like a 
“settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree,” the joint 
stipulation and order “changed the legal relationship between [the 
plaintiff] and the defendant.”87 Similarly, a plaintiff can substantially 
prevail through a scheduling order requiring release of records, even 
where the order is proposed by the governmental defendant.88 A 
settlement agreement between the parties can also result in a finding 
that a plaintiff substantially prevailed where the settlement would not 
have been achieved in the absence of litigation.89 
Joint stipulations and settlements are not the only situations in 
which a federal plaintiff can substantially prevail despite obtaining no 
court-ordered disclosure of records. When no court ordered a 
government agency to produce records, a plaintiff nonetheless 
substantially prevailed where a court of appeals held that the plaintiff 
could proceed with its complaint in district court.90 A plaintiff has also 
 
 85. United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 128 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 2015). 
 86. Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 87. Id. at 165–66 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604); see 
also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 774 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“The Court concludes that Judicial Watch substantially prevailed by virtue of the Court’s 
August 2006 acceptance of the parties’ joint stipulation.”). 
 88. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 820 F. 
Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Although Judge Leon adopted the schedule proposed by 
DOJ, the Order nonetheless required Defendant to complete processing of and produce 
all non-referred, non-exempt documents by a specified date.”); see also Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]he 
Scheduling Order changed the legal relationship between the parties and EPIC 
substantially-prevailed in this litigation as a result of its issuance.”). 
 89. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 410 
F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 90. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142 
(D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff in this Circuit may establish that he or she has substantially 
prevailed by obtaining a ruling that will force an agency to more fully comply with FOIA, 
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been found to substantially prevail simply by prompting “a speedier 
release of responsive records . . . as amply confirmed by the timing of 
the releases shortly after the initiation of [the] lawsuit.”91 One court 
has even held that two plaintiffs substantially prevailed when the 
records sought in their FOIA lawsuit were produced at the conclusion 
of an entirely separate lawsuit.92 Finally, where a government agency 
produced a large amount of information voluntarily but withheld a 
small amount of important documents, the plaintiff substantially 
prevailed when a court ordered the defendant to produce those 
documents.93 
Federal courts have also provided guidance on situations in 
which a plaintiff has not substantially prevailed. Where a FOIA 
plaintiff could not show a causal connection between its lawsuit and 
the production of records, it did not substantially prevail.94 Even 
under the catalyst framework, the mere fact that a government 
agency produces records after the filing of a FOIA suit is insufficient 
to show that a plaintiff substantially prevailed where the agency 
promptly began procedures to respond to the request and it was 
reasonable for the agency to take several months to respond.95 Put 
otherwise, while causing expedited production of records with a 
lawsuit may be enough for a plaintiff to substantially prevail, merely 
causing an agency to process a request is insufficient.96 In this way, the 
 
even if such a ruling does not require the actual release of the requested documents in that 
matter.”). 
 91. Dorsen v. SEC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 112, 120 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 92. Sabalos v. Regan, 520 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“The [defendant] 
released [the sought-after records] at the conclusion of [other] litigation, and not as a 
result of any order promulgated by this court. A plaintiff, however, still may ‘substantially 
prevail’ on an FOIA issue, even though the government did not release the requested 
information pursuant to court order.”). 
 93. Cazalas v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 660 F.2d 612, 622–23 (5th Cir. 1981) (“If we 
accept the government’s contention on its face, then the government could in any situation 
withhold the few ‘smoking gun’ documents, but release all other documents and argue that 
the complainant did not substantially prevail if it had to give up that ‘smoking gun’ as a 
result of the FOIA suit.”). 
 94. See Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 95. Am. Bird Conservancy v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 110 F. Supp. 3d 655, 664 
(E.D. Va. 2015) (“Courts that have considered this issue have uniformly held that the 
‘mere filing of the complaint and the subsequent release of the documents is insufficient to 
establish causation.’” (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1496 
(D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 96. Mobley v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The 
plaintiffs here argue that they are eligible for attorney’s fees because, prior to this action 
being filed, the defendant refused to process the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA request, and the 
plaintiffs’ first preliminary injunction motion caused the defendant to process the request 
. . . . The Court, however, cannot agree with the plaintiffs’ novel interpretation of the term 
‘substantially prevailed.’ . . . [T]he D.C. Circuit has interpreted the term ‘substantially 
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catalyst test has been used to withhold “substantially prevailing” 
status from a plaintiff where other factors contributed to a 
defendant’s delay in producing records.97 
2.  States with public records regimes similar to North Carolina’s 
provide further examples of when a plaintiff might substantially 
prevail. 
A number of other states award fees to plaintiffs who 
substantially prevail in freedom of information lawsuits. These states 
provide examples of different lenses through which a court could view 
a “substantially prevails” fee-shifting provision. For example, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals has read this language to be synonymous 
with “the successful party.”98 Where an Arizona plaintiff and 
defendant both prevail in part, the plaintiff has not substantially 
prevailed.99 
An Arkansas Public Records statute provides for a mandatory 
award of attorney’s fees to “a plaintiff who has substantially 
prevailed.”100 The Arkansas statute does not mention partial awards 
of attorney’s fees.101 Nonetheless, a trial court awarded a plaintiff “a 
fraction of” her attorney’s fees because she prevailed on “only 
sections of her complaint.”102 The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
reversed.103 The state’s high court noted that the plaintiff did not 
substantially prevail, “as required by the state statute.”104 Under these 
interpretations, the words “substantially prevail” leave no room for a 
party to partially prevail and receive a partial award of attorney’s 
fees. 
 
prevailed’ rather narrowly to require that a FOIA plaintiff relying on the catalyst theory 
must receive records responsive to its request in order for that plaintiff to have 
‘substantially prevailed.’” (citations omitted)). 
 97. Bigwood v. Def. Intelligence Agency, 770 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(finding that a plaintiff did not substantially prevail where the agency “expended a 
considerable amount of time” processing the plaintiff’s request prior to his filing suit, the 
request was extremely broad, and the agency “experienced a backlog of FOIA requests”). 
 98. Arpaio v. Citizen Pub. Co., 211 P.3d 8, 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 99. Democratic Party of Pima Cty. v. Ford, 269 P.3d 721, 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
 100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-107(d)(1) (LEXIS through 2018 Second Extraordinary 
Sess.). 
 101. Cf. LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:35D (West, Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary 
Sess.) (authorizing courts to award “reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion 
thereof” to any person who “prevails in part”). 
 102. City of Little Rock v. Carpenter, 288 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Ark. 2008). 
 103. Id. at 652–53. 
 104. Id. (finding further that the plaintiff did not even partially prevail). 
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Maryland also allows for an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff 
who “has substantially prevailed.”105 That state’s highest court has 
held that though “an actual judgment in” the plaintiff’s favor is not 
required to substantially prevail, there must at minimum be “a causal 
nexus between the prosecution of the suit and the agency’s surrender 
of the requested information.”106 This is similar to the federal catalyst 
standard.107 At least one Maryland court has found that the quality of 
documents is more important than the quantity.108 Such an 
interpretation could be of interest in North Carolina cases where a 
court orders production of a small amount of documents, while a 
larger body of records is withheld.109 
A number of New York cases construe its statute as providing a 
discretionary award of fees to a plaintiff who “has substantially 
prevailed under its Public Officers Law.”110 For example, where a 
defendant produced the sought records even before filing its answer, 
the plaintiff still substantially prevailed because it eventually 
“received the documents it sought.”111 Further, where a governmental 
defendant was ordered to produce only three of eighteen documents 
sought, the State’s appellate division expressed doubt that the 
defendant substantially prevailed.112 A New York plaintiff did not 
substantially prevail where the agency’s claimed exemptions were 
“largely sustained,” even though the plaintiff eventually obtained 
disclosure of certain records.113 
 
 105. MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS § 4-362(f) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 106. Caffrey v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 805 A.2d 268, 284 (Md. 2002) (quoting Kline 
v. Fuller, 496 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)). 
 107. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 108. See Kline v. Fuller, 496 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
 109. See, e.g., Deitz v. City of Belmont, No. 15-CVS-3203, at 1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 
1, 2016) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and ordering the 
City of Belmont to produce twenty-two pages of a 160-page report as public records). 
 110. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4(c) (McKinney 2018). 
 111. Acme Bus Corp. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 26 N.Y.S.3d 159, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); 
see also N.Y. State Defs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Police, 927 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2011) (holding that defendant’s production of records at the commencement of a lawsuit 
and without the need for further proceedings did not preclude a finding that the plaintiff 
substantially prevailed). But see William J. Kline & Son, Inc. v. Fallows, 478 N.Y.S.2d 524, 
528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff did not substantially prevail where the 
requested documents were released prior to the assertion of any defense by the agency). 
 112. Saxton v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 967 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013) (“With respect to the request for counsel fees, we find no basis to disturb [the] 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that, having secured the disclosure of only three additional 
documents out of the 18 sought, petitioners did not substantially prevail.”). 
 113. Cook v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep’t, 34 N.Y.S.3d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); see 
also Mack v. Howard, 937 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“[I]t cannot be said 
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Texas provides for a mandatory award of fees to a plaintiff who 
“substantially prevails” in a Public Records action,114 but its courts 
have interpreted the language very differently than their federal 
counterparts. Texas courts have cautioned that, where a 
governmental defendant voluntarily discloses some documents and a 
plaintiff files suit for the rest, the plaintiff must segregate out its non-
recoverable fees concerning the originally disclosed documents.115 
However, failure to do so does not automatically mean a plaintiff 
does not substantially prevail.116 
Texas is most notable for providing an example at the other end 
of the spectrum from the federal catalyst test. Where a Texas 
defendant voluntarily turns over documents and thus moots a Public 
Records lawsuit, this does not render the plaintiff a substantially 
prevailing party.117 This is because a Texas plaintiff may only receive 
fees where it obtains “judicially sanctioned ‘relief on the merits’” that 
“materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.”118 The 
Texas Attorney General cited such cases as examples of how fee 
awards are treated in Texas freedom of information cases.119 As 
recently as April 2017, the Court of Appeals of Texas explicitly 
declined to adopt the federal catalyst framework.120 However, this less 
plaintiff-friendly standard is paired with a mandatory award of 
attorney’s fees.121  
 It is worth noting that during the summer of 2017, the Texas 
legislature attempted to amend its standard for awarding attorney’s 
 
that petitioner ‘substantially prevailed’ in this proceeding inasmuch as he established his 
entitlement to only one of the numerous videotapes requested in the petition.”). 
 114. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 115. City of Houston v. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d 617, 629 (Tex. App. 2017); cf. Right to 
Know Comm. v. City Council, City & Cty. of Honolulu, 175 P.3d 111, 125–26 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 2007) (allowing a plaintiff to recover all of its attorney’s fees even though it only 
prevailed on some of its claims because the “unsuccessful claims were sufficiently related 
to the successful ones” and the plaintiffs “achieved a level of success that made the hours 
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award”). 
 116. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d at 629. 
 117. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703–04 
(Tex. App. 2013). 
 118. Id. at 703 (quoting Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 
S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)). 
 119. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., supra note 82, at 58 n.269. 
 120. Nehls v. Hartman Newspapers, LP, 522 S.W.3d 23, 31–32 (Tex. App. 2017) 
(declining to adopt the federal catalyst framework when urged to do so by a Public 
Records plaintiff). 
 121. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a 
plaintiff who substantially prevails.”) (emphasis added)). 
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fees to a more plaintiff-friendly approach.122 It did so by extending to 
courts the power to award attorney’s fees “incurred by a plaintiff to 
whom a governmental body voluntarily releases the requested 
information after filing an answer to the suit.”123 However, Governor 
Abbott vetoed the bill, claiming that it gave “lawyers the ability to 
threaten taxpayer-funded attorneys’ fee awards against governmental 
bodies that are just trying to follow the law.”124 North Carolina’s 
courts might keep this policy dispute in mind if and when they look to 
Texas case law for guidance. 
Other states take a more limited view of similar fee-shifting 
provisions. A Vermont court found that where records would not 
have been obtained without a plaintiff’s lawsuit, that plaintiff 
substantially prevailed.125 A Wisconsin court used a similar theory to 
deny “substantially prevailing” status to a plaintiff where 
“unavoidable delay,” rather than the plaintiff’s lawsuit, caused the 
governmental defendant’s untimely delay in fulfilling a records 
request.126 
None of these authorities are binding on North Carolina courts. 
However, they could prove useful should a factual situation arise in 
North Carolina that has already been litigated in another state. 
C. When the time comes for North Carolina courts to interpret the 
plaintiff’s fee provision of the NCPRA, they will be choosing 
between at least two competing frameworks. 
As noted, there is no North Carolina appellate case law 
interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of the plaintiffs’ fee-
shifting provision in the NCPRA. When the time comes for a court to 
do so, there are at least two particularly relevant models from which 
North Carolina could borrow. One is the federal standard requiring 
that a plaintiff’s suit be a “catalyst for change,” even if it does not 
“obtain a judgment in [its] favor.”127 The other is Texas’s rule that a 
 
 122. See H.B. 2783, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (June 15, 2017), 
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/vetoes/85/hb2783.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/C4HR-
EA5U] (announcing his disapproval and veto of House Bill 2783). 
 125. Burlington Free Press v. Univ. of Vt., 779 A.2d 60, 64 (Vt. 2001). 
 126. Racine Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 427 N.W.2d 414, 
417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (“If the failure to timely respond to a request was caused by an 
unavoidable delay accompanied by due diligence in the administrative processes, rather 
than being caused by the mandamus action, the plaintiff has not substantially prevailed.”). 
 127. United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 128–29 n.2 
(5th Cir. 2015); see also supra Part I.B.1. 
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plaintiff may only receive fees where it obtains “judicially sanctioned 
relief on the merits” that “materially alters the legal relationship 
between the parties.”128 The public records laws of North Carolina 
and Texas share nearly identical plaintiffs’ fee-shifting provisions.129 
Both provide for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff 
who substantially prevails, but prohibit such an award if a defendant 
acted “in reasonable reliance on” a court order or judgment 
applicable to the defendant, the published opinion of an appellate 
court, or a written decision or opinion of the states’ respective 
attorneys general.130 
Despite the lack of statutory language paralleling the federal 
catalyst test, North Carolina courts still could choose to adopt that 
test in interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of the 
NCPRA. One rationale for doing so could be the North Carolina fee-
shifting provision’s title and legislative history.131 The “substantially 
prevails” standard was first added as part of a bill entitled “An Act 
. . . to strengthen transparency . . . through increasing . . . accessibility 
to . . . public records.”132 The final session law striking the “prevailing 
party” standard and substituting in “substantially prevails” language 
retained a similar title.133 This legislative history could be indicative of 
the General Assembly’s intent to create a more plaintiff-friendly fee-
shifting policy. Indeed, a contemporary commentator noted that the 
new language “enhanc[ed] the ability of a prevailing plaintiff to 
recover its fees.”134 
Under the former “prevailing party” standard, the Court of 
Appeals in Spangler rejected the argument that plaintiffs had “the 
burden of showing that their lawsuit caused the agency to release the 
 
 128. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703 
(Tex. App. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 129. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 130. § 132-9(c); § 552.323 (Westlaw). 
 131. See Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 342, 737 S.E.2d 362, 370 (2013) (“[T]he title 
of an act may be an indication of legislative intent.”); see also Petty v. Owen, 140 N.C. 
App. 494, 500, 537 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2000) (using the title of an act as evidence of legislative 
intent to exempt general contractors from certain licensing requirements). 
 132. Act of Aug. 2, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (2017)).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Charles E. Coble, N.C. General Assembly Amends Public Records Law, BROOKS 
PIERCE: DIGITAL MEDIA & DATA PRIVACY BLOG (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.brookspierce.com/news-insights/nc-general-assembly-amends-public-records-law 
[https://perma.cc/TS96-42RT]. 
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documents.”135 The federal case upon which the defendant principally 
relied stated that, while a judgment is not an absolute prerequisite to 
an award of attorney’s fees, a plaintiff receiving an award of 
attorney’s fees must at least “show . . . that the prosecution of the 
action could reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the 
action had substantial causative effect on the delivery of the 
information.”136 The North Carolina Court of Appeals did not 
enunciate a clear test for whether a plaintiff prevails.137 It did, 
however, affirm the plaintiff’s fee award in the face of the defendant’s 
argument that the records would have been produced in a matter of 
days without the plaintiff’s lawsuit.138 
While the exact standard used by the Spangler court is not clear, 
that court did at least find that a plaintiff who obtained an order 
directing release of records was eligible for fees under the former 
“prevailing party” standard even where a defendant claimed that the 
release was for a reason other than the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.139 In doing 
so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a plaintiff’s 
lawsuit “must have been necessary to induce . . . disclosure” to qualify 
for a fee award.140 In other words, the Spangler court, at bare 
minimum, at least rejected the sort of rigid test requiring “judicially 
sanctioned relief on the merits” that “materially alters the legal 
relationship between the parties” adopted by Texas courts.141 Were 
North Carolina’s courts to adopt the Texas standard, they would 
therefore be interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of an 
act intended to increase access to public records to be no more liberal 
than the previous “prevailing party” standard in terms of whether a 
plaintiff is eligible for attorney’s fees. 
One might respond that the change in North Carolina’s fee 
award from discretionary to mandatory is enough for the act to 
 
 135. N.C. Press Ass’n v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 696–97, 381 S.E.2d 187, 189 
(1989). 
 136. Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976), 
abrogated by Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 137. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. at 698–99, 381 S.E.2d at 190–91. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“Here petitioners obtained an Order from the trial 
court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination and 
copying. That respondents were able to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending 
appeal does not alter the fact that petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”). 
 140. Spangler Brief, supra note 44, at 10. 
 141. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703 
(Tex. App. 2013) (citing Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 
S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)). 
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increase access to public records. Indeed, the more restrictive 
“substantially prevails” definition used by Texas courts is in the 
context of a mandatory fee award.142 Meanwhile, the more plaintiff-
friendly federal catalyst standard operates in conjunction with a 
discretionary award of fees.143 The argument would go that the 
General Assembly might have considered the less plaintiff-friendly 
“substantially prevails” standard to in fact increase access to public 
records when used in conjunction with a mandatory fee award. 
However, this argument assumes that the “substantially prevails” 
standard was added at the same time as the mandatory fee award, 
which is not the case. The “substantially prevails” language was added 
in 2010.144 Meanwhile, the mandatory fee award was added five years 
earlier.145 Therefore, one could not use the change to a mandatory fee 
award as evidence that the 2010 “substantially prevails” standard 
could increase access to public records while requiring judicially 
sanctioned relief as a condition for a plaintiff’s fee award. 
One might further argue that, had the General Assembly 
intended to adopt the catalyst standard when it added the 
“substantially prevails” language to the NCPRA, it would have 
adopted the same language that Congress used to adopt that standard 
in 2007.146 However, the rule that the General Assembly acts with 
knowledge of past enactments does not necessarily apply to the 
enactments of every other jurisdiction. Further, at least one other 
jurisdiction––the District of Columbia––has continued to use the 
catalyst test after its federal adoption in 2007, despite the fact that the 
District of Columbia has not adopted the federal statutory 
language.147 The District of Columbia’s courts have done so in part 
 
 142. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a 
plaintiff who substantially prevails.”) (emphasis added)). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (“The court may assess against the United States 
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in 
which the [plaintiff] has substantially prevailed.” (emphasis added)). 
 144. Act of Aug. 2, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)). 
 145. Act of Aug. 26, 2005, ch. 332, sec. 2, § 132-9, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1190, 1192 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)). 
 146. OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–175, sec. 4(a)(2)(II), 
§ 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)) 
(amending the federal Freedom of Information Act to clarify that a plaintiff substantially 
prevails where it receives judicial relief or where there is “a voluntary or unilateral change 
in position by the agency”); see also United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 
807 F.3d 125, 128–29 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that the 2007 amendment to the Freedom 
of Information Act instituted the catalyst theory). 
 147. Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015). 
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because “the catalyst theory accurately reflects the purposes of the 
FOIA attorney’s fee provision,”148 which includes the “expansion of 
public access and the minimization of costs and time delays to persons 
requesting information.”149 This reads similarly to the purpose of the 
NCPRA, which is to “provide for liberal access to public records.”150 
The NCPRA’s purpose is supported by a “strong policy in favor of 
disclosure.”151 The catalyst theory could, therefore, work within the 
NCPRA framework without the addition of the federal language. 
Depending on which of the two overarching models North 
Carolina follows, the world of Public Records law could look very 
different for plaintiffs and defendants. Should North Carolina follow 
the federal model, this could result in emboldened plaintiffs who 
know that they need not obtain formal judicial relief in order to 
receive an award of fees. Meanwhile, governmental defendants would 
likely feel the pressure of a system that, as they might see it, punishes 
them frequently and quickly for mistakes in responding to public 
records requests. On the other hand, should North Carolina courts 
opt to follow the Texas model requiring formal judicial relief before 
fees may be awarded, it is defendants who might be emboldened, and 
plaintiffs who may have to more seriously weigh the costs of litigation 
before filing suit for access to public records. 
D. Under the NCPRA, governmental defendants may receive 
attorney’s fee awards in relatively rare circumstances. 
The NCPRA also provides for defendants to receive fee awards 
in certain situations. A governmental defendant “shall” recover its 
reasonable attorney’s fees from “the person or persons instituting the 
action” where “the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous.”152 
“[A] claim . . . is ‘frivolous’ where its ‘proponent can present no 
rational argument based upon the evidence or law in support of it.’”153 
It is the mandatory nature of this award that differentiates it from the 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 2-531 (LEXIS through Aug. 21, 2018)). 
 150. Jackson v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 238 N.C. App. 351, 353, 768 
S.E.2d 23, 25 (2014) (quoting Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 
462, 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1999)). 
 151. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C. 
App. 711, 716, 425 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1993) (recognizing the strong policy in favor of 
disclosure of public records). 
 152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(d) (2017). 
 153. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 242 N.C. App. 456, 458, 775 S.E.2d 882, 884 
(2015) (quoting Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 689, 562 S.E.2d 82, 94 (2002)) 
(defining “frivolous” in the context of claims for punitive damages against hospitals). 
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generally available fee award for defendants where a plaintiff fails to 
raise a justifiable claim.154 
Where a plaintiff files a Public Records lawsuit seeking access to 
records that are categorically exempt from disclosure, a court may at 
least reserve a defendant’s request for fees for further 
consideration.155 However, the exact language of the NCPRA has not 
been interpreted by any North Carolina appellate court. The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina had 
the opportunity to comment on the issue in Quality Built Homes, Inc. 
v. Village of Pinehurst.156 While the interpretation of a state law by a 
federal court is not binding, North Carolina courts may find the 
federal analysis persuasive.157 
In Quality Built Homes, Inc., the plaintiffs made a public records 
request in person to the Office of the Clerk of the Village of 
Pinehurst on December 22, 2006.158 The clerk initially refused to 
produce the documents, but then produced them “no later than 13 
days after the original request.”159 Over five months later, the 
plaintiffs amended an existing complaint to add an allegation that the 
defendant Village violated the NCPRA with its “initial refusal to 
produce the documents on the day they were requested.”160 
The court noted that the NCPRA “does not provide a claim for 
relief after documents have been produced, nor does it provide for a 
remedy that would prevent potential future violations.”161 It therefore 
disposed of the plaintiffs’ claims under the NCPRA fairly quickly. 
However, that was not the end of the matter. The defendant Village 
requested its attorney’s fees, claiming that the plaintiff’s Public 
 
 154. Compare § 132-9(d) (stating that the court “shall” assess the attorney fees if the 
court determines that the case was brought in bad faith or frivolous), with id. § 6-21.5 
(stating that the court “may” award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in nonjusticiable 
cases). 
 155. See, e.g., Rothman v. Town of Elon, No. 05-CVS-122, 2005 WL 5368433 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2005), appeal dismissed, Rothman v. Town of Elon, No. COA05-1151, 
2006 WL 851766 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2006). 
 156. No. 1:06CV1028, 2008 WL 3503149 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008). But see Davis v. 
Dep’t of State, No. 4:13CV58, 2014 WL 11514765, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2014) (noting 
that a federal court generally “lacks jurisdiction to consider or enforce” North Carolina’s 
Public Records law), aff’d, 607 F. App’x 329 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 157. See, e.g., Huggard v. Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 102 N.C. App. 772, 775, 403 
S.E.2d 568, 570 (1991) (“As an interpretation of state law by a federal court this holding is 
not binding on us; however we find its analysis persuasive.”), aff’d, 330 N.C. 610, 411 
S.E.2d 610 (1992). 
 158. Quality Built Homes, Inc., 2008 WL 3503149, at *13. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *14. 
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Records Act claim was “filed in bad faith or . . . frivolous.”162 The 
court agreed, finding that the “[p]laintiffs’ claim was, at least, 
frivolous and, at most, brought in bad faith.”163 Not only did the 
defendant produce the records “within a reasonable time from the 
request,” but “the request was made on December 22, the Friday 
before the week of Christmas.”164 The court further found that the 
defendant’s decision to escort the original records requester off of its 
premises using police did “not negate the frivolous nature of 
Plaintiffs’ claim.”165 The court ultimately awarded the defendant its 
reasonable attorney’s fees “incurred in defending [the plaintiffs’ 
NCPRA claim].”166 
The Quality Built Homes, Inc. decision is not binding on North 
Carolina state courts, as it is a federal district court decision applying 
North Carolina law.167 However, it does present a straightforward 
application of the defendant’s fee provision under the NCPRA. 
Future litigants would be wise to think twice before filing a Public 
Records lawsuit in North Carolina after already receiving the 
disputed records, as they would risk being charged the attorney’s fees 
of the defendant. Practitioners would further be wise to avoid 
bringing claims for relief that are not grounded in the language of the 
NCPRA. 
Several other jurisdictions require some sort of higher standard 
for a defendant to recover its fees in a Public Records lawsuit than 
merely prevailing.168 For example, California allows an award of 
 
 162. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(d) (2017)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Self v. Yelton, 201 N.C. App. 653, 661, 688 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2010) (noting that an 
unpublished federal district court case “may sometimes be persuasive . . . [though] not 
precedential”); Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 172 N.C. App. 475, 479, 617 S.E.2d 61, 
64 (2005) (“Although we are not bound by federal case law, we may find their analysis and 
holdings persuasive.”), aff’d, 361 N.C. 137, 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006). 
 168. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005(d) (2017) (“The court may award 
attorney fees and costs to a successful defendant, but only if the court finds that the action 
was frivolous or was brought solely for the purpose of harassment.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 119.12(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The court shall determine whether the complainant 
requested to inspect or copy a public record or participated in the civil action for an 
improper purpose. If the court determines there was an improper purpose, the court may 
not assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney 
fees, to the complainant, and shall assess and award against the complainant and to the 
agency the reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the agency in 
responding to the civil action. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘improper 
purpose’ means a request to inspect or copy a public record or to participate in the civil 
action primarily to cause a violation of this chapter or for a frivolous purpose.”). 
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attorney’s fees to a Public Records defendant only where “the 
plaintiff’s case is clearly frivolous.”169 Where a plaintiff brought suit 
against a governmental defendant which inadvertently neglected to 
attach a few requested documents to an email, a California appellate 
court reversed the trial court’s grant of attorney’s fees in favor of the 
defendant.170 This decision signaled a more stringent interpretation of 
“frivolous” than the NCPRA. In doing so, the appellate court noted 
that an action can lack merit, and it can even be “extremely unlikely” 
that the plaintiff will prevail, but this is not enough for a suit to be 
“frivolous.”171 The Ninth Circuit has noted that under the California 
Public Records Act, a plaintiff’s claim is “clearly frivolous” only when 
it “lacks any merit” or is “prosecuted for an improper motive.”172 
While interpreting a similar statute dealing with fee awards to 
governmental defendants in Open Meetings cases, California courts 
confirmed that it is very difficult for a government defendant to 
recover its fees.173 
Minnesota allows “reasonable costs and attorney fees” to a 
governmental defendant when “the court determines” that a Public 
Records suit “is frivolous and without merit and a basis in fact.”174 In 
2003, the County of Steele sought its fees under this statute after the 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that an architectural firm 
erroneously named the county as a defendant in its Public Records 
lawsuit.175 The lower court declined to award the defendant county its 
fees, and the county appealed, claiming that the plaintiff’s claim was 
“obviously frivolous” and had “no basis in fact.”176 Despite the fact 
that the plaintiff obtained no relief from the court and had in fact 
sued the wrong party, the appellate court found that the plaintiff’s 
 
 169. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6259(d) (West 2018). 
 170. Crews v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 171. Id. at 494 (quoting Flaherty v. Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 187 (Cal. 1982) (en banc)). 
 172. Maryland ex rel. Doe v. Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 840 F.3d 640, 644 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Bertoli v. City of Sabstopol, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2015)). 
 173. See Boyle v. City of Redondo Beach, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999) (noting that when a defendant seeks attorney’s fees under California’s Open 
Meetings law, “a trial court must specify with particularity the basis for the awarding costs 
or attorney fees”); see also Frazer v. Dixon Unified Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 653 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a trial court’s award of fees to a defendant in an Open 
Meetings suit after finding that the defendant prevailed on the majority of the plaintiff’s 
claims). 
 174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.08(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 175. WDSI, Inc. v. Cty. of Steele, 672 N.W.2d 617, 621–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 176. Id. at 622. 
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case “had a basis in fact and was not frivolous or without merit.”177 
Therefore, the mere mistakes of the plaintiff were not enough to 
merit an award of fees to the defendant under statutory language 
similar to that in North Carolina. 
Pennsylvania provides for a discretionary award of attorney fees 
to a requester of records where “the court finds that the legal 
challenge . . . was frivolous.”178 However, at the appellate level, the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a losing plaintiff’s 
case is not frivolous where the case presents a novel legal issue.179 
That same court has further found that an appeal is not frivolous 
simply because a plaintiff erroneously believes that a defendant is 
subject to the Public Records law.180 
Ultimately, courts tend to be reluctant to award fees to 
defendants in Public Records actions brought under schemes that are 
similar to North Carolina’s. This confirms the observation that, under 
such provisions, it is “likely that only the most outrageous kind of 
harassment [by a plaintiff] would ever be condemned.”181 Defendants 
in North Carolina should therefore rarely, if ever, expect to receive a 
fee award at the conclusion of Public Records litigation. 
For plaintiffs, fee awards are intended to incentivize litigation182 
and increase access to public records.183 This same policy rationale 
 
 177. Id. at 623. It is worth noting that the County of Steele’s contract with a private 
party failed to state, as required by law, that all of the data held by the private party in 
connection with the contract was subject to the state’s Public Records law. Id. at 621. 
While the court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claim was against the private party and 
not the county, the error in the contract between the county and the private party meant 
there was a genuine question of law as to whether the county was required to produce the 
information. Id. at 621–22. 
 178. 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1304(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 
Reg. Sess. Act 16). 
 179. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform v. Pa. Office of Admin., 129 A.3d 1246, 1264 
n.23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (“[S]ince none of [the Office of Open Records’] prior 
determinations regarding public access to records of PAC contributions made by 
Commonwealth employees via payroll deduction have been reviewed by this Court, the 
instant legal challenge is not frivolous.”); see also Hearst Television, Inc. v. Norris, 8 A.3d 
420, 428 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he [government defendant’s] request for costs and 
fees . . . is denied because the issue presented in this appeal is a novel issue and involves 
the interpretation of two complicated statutes.”), rev’d, 54 A.3d 23 (2012). 
 180. Scott v. Del. Valley Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 56 A.3d 40, 47 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2012) (finding that even though the plaintiff erroneously believed that the defendant was 
subject to the state Public Records Act, there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s legal 
challenge was frivolous). 
 181. Lowell Thomas Lunsford II, Unintended Consequences, N.C. ST. B.J., Winter 
2013, at 6, 7, https://www.ncbar.gov/media/121117/journal-18-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/568T-
RWEN]. 
 182. See Cmty. Youth Athletic Ctr. v. City of Nat’l City, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 694 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“Indeed, the very purpose of the attorney fees provision is to 
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underlies fee awards for defendants––not in incentivizing defendants 
to litigate, but rather in punishing only those plaintiffs who bring the 
most frivolous of suits. The goal of both the plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ fee awards is to embolden plaintiffs to seek access to 
records, and in doing so, to keep government open, honest, and 
accountable. This approach is in line with the general policy rationale 
underlying the NCPRA.184 
II.  NORTH CAROLINA OPEN MEETINGS FEE AWARDS: 
“PREVAILING PARTIES” 
In addition to the fee awards of the NCPRA, both plaintiffs and 
defendants can also seek attorney’s fees in litigation under the Open 
Meetings law, which generally embodies North Carolina’s public 
policy “that the hearings, deliberations, and actions of [public] bodies 
be conducted openly.”185 The law requires that all public bodies “be 
open to the public” and “any person [be] entitled to attend” such 
meetings.186 Public bodies may only enter into closed sessions for a 
limited number of specifically enumerated purposes.187 Additionally, 
they must further keep a regular schedule of meetings on file and post 
notices of any meeting times that deviate from the regular schedule.188 
There are two remedies for violations of the Open Meetings law. 
The first is an injunction prohibiting threatened, recurring, or 
continuing violations.189 The second is a declaration that an action was 
taken in violation of the Open Meetings law, upon entry of which a 
 
provide ‘protections and incentives for members of the public to seek judicial enforcement 
of their right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.’” (quoting Galbiso v. Orosi 
Pub. Util. Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))). 
 183. See Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 
2015) (stating that fee awards will incentivize disclosure of documents). 
 184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1(b) (2017) (“[I]t is the policy of this State that the people 
may obtain copies of their public records and public information free or at minimal cost 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law.”); see also N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. 
N.C. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C. App. 711, 716, 425 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1993) 
(noting that the NCPRA provides for a “strong policy in favor of disclosure”). 
 185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2017) (“Whereas the public bodies that administer 
the legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, and advisory functions of 
North Carolina and its political subdivisions exist solely to conduct the people’s business, 
it is the public policy of North Carolina that the hearings, deliberations, and actions of 
these bodies be conducted openly.”). 
 186. Id. § 143-318.10(a). 
 187. See id. § 143-318.11(a) (listing the ten purposes for which a public body may enter 
into closed session and describing the procedure for calling such a session). 
 188. Id. § 143-318.12(b). 
 189. Id. § 143-318.16. 
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court may declare the illegal action null and void.190 An action 
seeking such declaratory relief “must be commenced within 45 days 
following the initial disclosure of the action that the suit seeks to have 
declared null and void.”191 
A. Comparison of the Open Meetings Law with the NCPRA 
The Open Meetings law provides that a court “may award the 
prevailing party or parties a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed 
against the losing party.”192 This fee provision is noticeably different 
than that of the NCPRA in two immediately apparent ways. First, 
both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ fee provisions in the NCPRA are 
mandatory, meaning a court must award fees if it finds that the 
conditions of the statute are satisfied.193 In contrast, the Open 
Meetings law provides a court with the discretionary power to award 
attorney’s fees when it so chooses.194 Second, with its Public Records 
law, North Carolina makes fees more readily available for a plaintiff 
than a defendant.195 The Open Meetings law, by contrast, provides the 
same standard for any party seeking fees.196 
While today’s fee award is discretionary, this was not always the 
case. The General Assembly changed the award from mandatory to 
discretionary in 1994.197 Prior to this change, a prevailing party was 
“entitled” to a fee award.198 But while the decision to award 
attorney’s fees under the Open Meetings law is itself discretionary, 
the determination of which party or parties prevail is not. Rather, 
“[t]he designation of a party as a prevailing party . . . is a legal 
determination which [an appellate court reviews] de novo.”199 
Therefore, a North Carolina appellate court has the power to 
 
 190. Id. § 143-318.16A(a). 
 191. Id. § 143-318.16A(b). 
 192. Id. § 143-318.16B. 
 193. Id. § 132-9(c)–(d). 
 194. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App. 192, 201, 
696 S.E.2d 559, 566 (2010). 
 195. § 132-9(c)–(d) (providing that a plaintiff must receive attorney’s fees if it 
substantially prevails, but a defendant only receives fees if the action “was filed in bad 
faith or was frivolous”). 
 196. See id. § 143-318.16B. 
 197. See Act of June 23, 1994, ch. 570, sec. 3, § 143-318.16B, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 181, 
186 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.318.16B (2017)) (changing “shall” to “may” in the 
Open Meetings fee award provision, thereby making the award discretionary). 
 198. Jacksonville Daily News Co. v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 127, 131, 
439 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1993) (“We note . . . that plaintiff, as prevailing party, is entitled to a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.”). 
 199. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 201, 696 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Smyth 
ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
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determine that a party prevailed as a matter of law and order a trial 
court to consider awarding attorney’s fees on remand.200 
In making this legal determination, a court uses the “merits test,” 
under which a party may only be considered “prevailing” if it won 
“on the merits of at least some of [its] claims.”201 The North Carolina 
courts have taken this “merits test” from the Fourth Circuit’s 
treatment of fee awards in federal civil rights cases.202 The term is not 
unique to the Open Meetings law, and should be read consistently as 
a term of art–“that is, without distinctions based on the particular 
statutory context in which it appears.”203 The treatment of the term by 
North Carolina courts in other contexts is therefore informative.204 
In addition to its discretionary, rather than mandatory, fee 
award, the Open Meetings law also jettisons the NCPRA’s distinction 
between defendant and plaintiff fee awards. The Open Meetings law 
simply provides that a court may award fees to a “prevailing party or 
parties.”205 It does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and 
defendants.206 In a given case, either party has the opportunity to 
prevail.207 However, the Open Meetings law does not expressly 
provide for a partial award of fees to a party that partially prevails.208 
 
 200. See Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008) (“Knight’s 
pleadings in Superior Court clearly sought to establish a violation of the Open Meetings 
Law. We have determined as a matter of law that such violations occurred. We hold that 
Knight is a prevailing party under the statute . . . and the taxing of attorney’s fees should 
be considered by the trial court upon remand.”). 
 201. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 57, 
468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 350 (4th Cir. 
1980)). 
 202. Id. (citing Smith, 632 F.2d at 350 (applying the merits test in the context of an 
attorney’s fees award to a “prevailing party” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964)). 
 203. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 296 N.C. App. at 203, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting 
Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 204. See infra Part II.B. 
 205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16B (2017). 
 206. See id.  
 207. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 203, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (“[W]e hold that 
more than one party—including both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action—can 
be the prevailing party entitled to fees.”); see also Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n. v. 
Town of Hildebran, No. 15 CVS 180, 2015 WL 11182441, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 
2015) (“Applying the merits test for determining whether a prevailing party is entitled to 
attorney’s fees under N.C.G.S. § 143-318.16B, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendant Hildebran are both prevailing parties.”). 
 208. Compare § 143-318.16B, with LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:26 (West, Westlaw through 
2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (“If a person who brings an enforcement proceeding . . . 
prevails in part, the court may award him reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate 
portion thereof. If the court finds that the proceeding was of a frivolous nature and was 
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In the most straightforward cases, a plaintiff who alleges a 
violation of the Open Meetings law and then establishes that such 
violation occurred has prevailed.209 However, a plaintiff need not 
prevail on every claim in order to be a prevailing party eligible for an 
award of attorney’s fees. For example, where a plaintiff sought both 
an injunction prohibiting future violations of the Open Meetings law 
and a declaration voiding the challenged action, but obtained only the 
injunction, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the 
plaintiff was a “prevailing party.”210 The court reasoned that 
prevailing on the “primary legal question in its cause of action” was a 
“significant success” for the plaintiff, making it a “prevailing party.”211 
A plaintiff can therefore prevail even if it does not obtain “everything 
set out in its prayer for relief.”212  
There are no North Carolina appellate decisions finding that a 
defendant alone was the prevailing party in an Open Meetings 
lawsuit. However, despite the legislature’s silence as to whether the 
partial fee awards are available,213 the courts have made clear that 
both a defendant and a plaintiff can be prevailing parties. For 
example, the court of appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s finding 
that both a plaintiff and a defendant prevailed.214 The trial court 
found that the plaintiffs prevailed by succeeding “on a significant 
issue . . . by securing an adjudication that the Defendant . . . violated 
 
brought with no substantial justification, it may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”). 
 209. See Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008) (“Knight’s 
pleadings in Superior Court clearly sought to establish a violation of the Open Meetings 
Law. We have determined as a matter of law that such violations occurred. We hold that 
Knight is a prevailing party under the statute . . . and the taxing of attorney’s fees should 
be considered by the trial court upon remand.”). 
 210. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 58, 
468 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1996). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 202, 696 S.E.2d at 566 (citing H.B.S. 
Contractors, 122 N.C. App. at 58, 468 S.E.2d at 523); see also Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 212 So. 3d 892, 906 (Ala. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff must “receive at 
least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail” (quoting 
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1986))). 
 213. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16B (2017). 
 214. See Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Hildebran, __ N.C. App. 
__, __, 798 S.E.2d 761, 767 (2017) (affirming a trial court’s finding that both parties 
succeeded on significant issues in the litigation and were, therefore, both prevailing 
parties); Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 203–04, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (finding that 
the trial court mistakenly believed that it was required to designate either the plaintiffs or 
the defendants as the prevailing party). 
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the Open Meetings Law in one of the ways contended.”215 The 
defendant likewise prevailed by succeeding “on several significant 
issues . . . by securing a directed verdict on all but one of the Plaintiff’s 
claims.”216 Even though the fee award under the Open Meetings law 
is for any party that prevails, a court could still consider that fee 
awards assessed against plaintiffs could “have a ‘chilling effect’ and 
defer citizens from filing . . . suits in the future.”217 
North Carolina trial courts have provided further examples of 
prevailing plaintiffs under the Open Meetings law. Where the 
Chatham County Board of Elections illegally called an emergency 
meeting, failed to convene in open session, failed to go into closed 
session pursuant to motion, failed to keep proper minutes, and failed 
to provide timely notice of its meetings, the trial court found that the 
plaintiff was a prevailing party.218 At the other end of the spectrum, 
where a plaintiff challenged two meetings of the Guilford County 
Board of Elections but both were found to comply with the law, the 
plaintiff did not prevail.219 At least one trial court has found that a 
plaintiff who is able to show only a “very minor technical violation” 
of the Open Meetings law should not receive a fee award.220 
B. North Carolina courts have provided examples of when a party 
prevails in other contexts. 
There are only three published North Carolina appellate 
opinions providing guidance on when a party prevails in the Open 
Meetings context.221 However, more on how North Carolina courts 
adjudicate “prevailing party” status can be learned from treatment of 
the term in other contexts. 
 
 215. Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n. v. Town of Hildebran, No. 15 CVS 180, 2015 
WL 11182441, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2015) 
 216. Id. 
 217. Kahana Sunset Owners Ass’n v. Maui Cty. Council, 948 P.2d 122, 126 (Haw. 1997) 
(considering a chilling effect on plaintiffs to be a factor weighing against assessing fee 
awards against plaintiffs under a scheme where the court was authorized to award fees to 
any prevailing party). 
 218. Lothrop v. Chatham Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 06-CVS-239, 2006 WL 4526077, at 
*5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2006). 
 219. Sigma Constr. Co., v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 00-CVS-5267, 2000 WL 
35514250, at *7 (N.C. Super Ct. Apr. 24, 2000). 
 220. Womack Newspapers, Inc. v. Dare Cty. Tourism Bd., No. 09-CVS-473, 2009 WL 
8634982, at *12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 1, 2009). 
 221. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App. 
192, 201–10, 696 S.E.2d 559, 565–67 (2010); Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 
S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008); H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. 
App. 49, 56–58 468 S.E.2d 517, 522–23 (1996). 
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For example, where a party appeals or defends against an agency 
decision, it may receive an award of attorney’s fees if it prevails.222 In 
North Carolina Alliance for Transportation Reform v. United States 
Department of Transportation,223 a North Carolina federal district 
court considered whether an environmental group could recover its 
attorney’s fees from North Carolina state agencies.224 The case was 
dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of all parties.225 Nonetheless, the 
court found that the plaintiff had prevailed under both the state 
statute and its federal corollary.226 The court reasoned that the order 
of dismissal “embodie[d] a significant portion of the relief Plaintiffs 
sought in filing the civil action in the first place,” and the plaintiffs 
were therefore prevailing parties.227 
However, simply arriving at a joint dismissal or settlement of a 
case is not enough for a party to prevail. Where a plaintiff entered 
into a final settlement agreement but did not succeed on “any 
significant issue in the litigation,” the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had not prevailed.228 The court came 
to this conclusion by examining “the benefits sought by the plaintiffs 
in the complaint versus those actually obtained by settlement.”229 
The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
also awards “a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney 
representing the prevailing party” under certain circumstances.230 In 
that context, where the trial court and court of appeals denied a 
plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment interest but the motion was then 
granted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the plaintiff 
prevailed.231 The court noted that attorney’s fees are allowed “for 
services rendered at all stages of litigation, including appeals.”232 The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has also clarified that a court may 
retain jurisdiction of a case even after dismissal for the purpose of 
ruling on post-dismissal motions for attorney’s fees.233 
 
 222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1(a) (2017). 
 223. 151 F. Supp. 2d 661 (M.D.N.C. 2001). 
 224. Id. at 669. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 671. 
 227. Id. at 674. 
 228. House v. Hillhaven, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 191, 196, 412 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1992). 
 229. Id. 
 230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (2017). 
 231. See Custom Molders, Inc. v. Am. Yard Prod., Inc., 342 N.C. 133, 141, 463 S.E.2d 
199, 204 (1995). 
 232. Id. (citing Cotton v. Stanley, 94 N.C. App. 367, 370, 380 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1989)). 
 233. Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 664, 412 S.E.2d 327, 338 (1992). 
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Combining these North Carolina cases with direct treatment of 
the Open Meetings law by the state’s courts, North Carolina 
practitioners have a usable, if not dense, body of state case law from 
which they can work. 
C. In the absence of binding case law, North Carolina courts may 
lean heavily on the Fourth Circuit’s “prevailing party” 
jurisprudence. 
In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under the Open 
Meetings law, North Carolina courts may look to the Fourth Circuit’s 
treatment of fee awards in federal civil rights cases.234 The federal 
statutory language provides that a court, “in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”235 While federal case law 
interpreting that statute is certainly not binding on North Carolina 
courts, the state’s courts use federal decisions as persuasive 
guidance.236 
The Fourth Circuit has held that, in order to prevail, a party 
“‘need not prevail on all issues if a significant one is resolved’ in its 
favor.”237 Where bringing a suit caused a governmental defendant to 
correct unconstitutional procedures during litigation, the plaintiffs 
were found to be prevailing parties.238 A plaintiff can even prevail 
where its suit is voluntarily dismissed and other complaints contribute 
to a change in policy, so long as the plaintiff’s suit makes a “major 
contribution” to the change.239 By contrast, a plaintiff who failed to 
 
 234. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 57, 
468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (applying the “merits test” in the context of an attorney’s fees 
award to a “prevailing party” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (citing Smith 
v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 350 (4th Cir. 1980))). 
 235. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). 
 236. See H.B.S. Contractors, Inc., 122 N.C. App. at 57, 468 S.E.2d at 522–23. 
 237. Lotz Realty Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 717 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 
1983) (quoting Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979)), overruled by S-1 & S-
2 by & through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(overruling all cases that apply the “catalyst theory” in finding that a party is prevailing). 
 238. See Reigh v. Schleigh, 829 F.2d 1334, 1335 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n award may be 
made even if plaintiff does not obtain a favorable judgment if it is found that plaintiff’s 
actions caused defendant to remedy his errant ways.”). 
 239. See DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that where the 
plaintiffs’ class action suit was only one of several complaints that “contributed to [a] 
change in policy” relating to strip searches, the plaintiffs were nonetheless entitled to a fee 
award as prevailing parties because their suit made a “major contribution” towards that 
change). 
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state a claim on which relief could be granted was not allowed to 
recover its attorney’s fees.240 
While the Fourth Circuit’s case law may be plaintiff-friendly in 
some respects, there is one bright-line limitation. The Fourth Circuit 
has rejected a catalyst theory that allows a plaintiff to recover fees as 
a prevailing party where its lawsuit does nothing more than “operate 
as a catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant’s conduct.”241 
The United States Supreme Court also rejected such a catalyst theory 
in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health & Human Resources,242 finding that a 
“defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps 
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, 
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”243 The 
Buckhannon decision thus “resolved . . . the issue of whether the 
catalyst theory was an appropriate means of determining if the 
plaintiff was a prevailing party.”244 Should the North Carolina courts 
follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead, it would mean a rejection of the 
catalyst theory in the Open Meetings context. 
D. In light of the Supreme Court’s Buckhannon decision, 
jurisdictions outside the Fourth Circuit can also provide guidance 
to North Carolina courts on “prevailing party” status. 
The D.C. Circuit’s case law since the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Buckhannon could be instructive to a court deciding which, if any, 
parties prevail under a system that rejects a catalyst theory of 
recovery. The D.C. Circuit has laid out three factors that must be 
considered when adjudicating prevailing party status: (1) “a court-
ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties,” (2) a 
judgment “in favor of the party seeking fees,” and (3) a “judicial 
pronouncement . . . accompanied by judicial relief.”245 Where a 
defendant’s prevailing party status is being adjudicated, only the last 
 
 240. See Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F. Supp. 561, 571–72 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, Davis v. 
Hudgins, Nos. 95-2532, 96-1126, 1996 WL 327205, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 241. S-1 & S-2 by & through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th 
Cir. 1994). 
 242. 532 U.S. 598 (2001), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 31, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
175, sec. 4, § 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2525, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (2012)). 
 243. Id. at 605. 
 244. Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Dickerson, 444 F. App’x 660, 663 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 245. Texas v. Holder, 63 F. Supp. 3d 54, 63 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Green Aviation 
Mgmt. Co. v. FAA, 676 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
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two factors are relevant.246 Such a framework, in theory, may be used 
by North Carolina courts in deciding whether a party has prevailed in 
an Open Meetings lawsuit. 
Examples from states with similar Open Meetings fee-shifting 
statutes can also prove instructive. The simplest cases are those where 
a plaintiff clearly succeeds or fails. For example, many California fee 
awards simply turn on whether the governmental defendant violated 
the state’s Open Meetings law.247 However, some cases from other 
states can provide insight into how more complicated situations are 
resolved. For example, where the Oregon Open Meetings law allows 
an award of fees to a “successful”248 plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon held that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under that law is 
not “held to the exacting showings and standard of proof which apply 
to a party that seeks injunctive relief.”249 Rather, the plaintiff need 
only present a prima facie case under the law, and then the burden 
shifts to the government body to show that there was no violation.250 
Arizona provides for a discretionary award of fees to a 
“successful plaintiff.”251 Its courts balance the extent to which the 
governmental defendant attempted to comply with the Open 
Meetings law with the extent to which a successful plaintiff’s action 
was beneficial to others.252 Nebraska similarly allows for a fee award 
to a “successful plaintiff.”253 Its courts have made clear that a party 
need not accomplish every objective of its lawsuit in order to qualify 
for a fee award.254 Nebraska courts have further held that “success 
 
 246. See id. 
 247. See Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 384 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (noting that a violation of the Open Meetings law is a condition precedent to a 
plaintiff’s recovery of attorney’s fees); see also San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 426–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that a plaintiff could recover 
attorney’s fees because the defendant city violated the state’s Open Meetings law). 
 248. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.680(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 249. Oregon Ass’n of Classified Emps. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist. 24J, 767 P.2d 1365, 
1368 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
 250. Id. at 1368–69. 
 251. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.07(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018 First 
Special Sess.), amended by Act of Apr. 17, 2018, ch 229, sec. 3, § 38-431.07, 2018 Ariz. Sess. 
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 252. See Carefree Imp. Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985, 993–94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982). 
 253. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-1414(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg. 
Sess.). 
 254. See, e.g., Wolf v. Grubbs, 759 N.W.2d 499, 526 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (“The fact 
that the [plaintiffs] did not accomplish the full objective of their lawsuit does not prevent 
them from being ‘successful plaintiffs,’ but, rather, goes to the extent of an award for 
attorney fees, as the results obtained are an appropriate consideration on that issue.” 
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can be measured in small ways.”255 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has agreed that a plaintiff need not obtain all of the relief that it seeks 
in any Open Meetings case in order to be considered a prevailing 
party eligible for attorney’s fees.256 These examples from other 
jurisdictions may prove useful to North Carolina practitioners, 
particularly if a factual scenario that has already been litigated under 
a similar fee-shifting scheme should arise. 
E. Other jurisdictions can further guide North Carolina trial courts 
on how to exercise discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. 
Achieving prevailing party status is only half the battle for a 
party in a North Carolina Open Meetings case. The ultimate decision 
of whether to award attorney’s fees lies within the discretion of the 
trial court.257 It is inherently difficult to define how a court will 
exercise this discretion. However, tests formulated by other 
jurisdictions for when to award fees to a prevailing party could be 
useful for North Carolina trial courts in making this discretionary 
determination. 
Similar to North Carolina, Montana’s “Right to Know” provision 
provides that a court “may” award attorney’s fees to “a plaintiff who 
prevails,” and “therefore gives the district court the discretion to 
award attorney fees.”258 However, this discretion is “not 
unfettered.”259 While declining to articulate “firm guidelines” for 
when a trial court might deny attorney’s fees, Montana courts 
nonetheless have noted that “outright denial of a motion for attorney 
fees without rationale, is ‘not an exercise of discretion, but is an abuse 
of that discretion.’”260 A trial court would do better to make its 
 
(quoting Hansmeyer v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 578 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Neb. Ct. App. 
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 256. See Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 976 A.2d 349, 374–75 (Md. 2009) 
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party bringing an action alleging an Open Meetings Act violation must obtain the relief it 
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Cty., 2006 MT 218, at ¶ 30, 143 P.3d at 142). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018) 
1764 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
conclusions on the record, as this leaves less room for second-guessing 
of discretion at the appellate level.261 
Further, South Carolina courts provide six factors to consider 
when awarding attorney’s fees, one of which is the nature of the 
“beneficial results obtained” by the plaintiff.262 In theory, a plaintiff 
who obtained only partial relief could still receive an award of fees if 
a court found that it made a strong showing on the other five 
factors.263 A trial court who addressed these factors in a “conclusory” 
fashion was ordered to give them “full and proper consideration” on 
remand.264 
Maryland’s courts similarly provide factors for a trial court to use 
when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to award attorney’s 
fees for an Open Meetings violation.265 These factors, while providing 
some level of predictability, could also be viewed as robbing courts of 
the very flexibility that defines the exercise of discretion.266 
Wisconsin courts consider a prevailing plaintiff in an Open 
Meetings case to serve as a “private attorney general . . . vindicating 
his or her own rights and the rights of the public to open 
government.”267 They therefore award attorney’s fees “if an award 
would advance the purpose of the Open Meetings law: to ensure that 
the public has the fullest and most complete information possible 
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 267. Wisconsin ex rel. Hodge v. Town of Turtle Lake, 508 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Wis. 1993). 
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regarding the affairs of government.”268 The Court of Appeals of 
Arizona has similarly found that attorney’s fees should be awarded 
where such an award would “[give] effect to the intent that the 
legislature has expressed in the Open Meeting law and which is set 
forth in the declaration of public policy.”269 If this condition is met, 
then an award of fees should only be denied where “special 
circumstances would render an award unjust.”270 However, it is worth 
noting that, unlike North Carolina, both Arizona and Wisconsin 
recognize the private attorney general doctrine.271 Therefore, North 
Carolina courts and practitioners should look to states with more 
similar fee award schemes before turning to private attorney general 
jurisdictions. 
California’s appellate courts have taken the step of limiting the 
discretion of the trial court to the “fairly narrow” class of situations 
where “the defendant shows that special circumstances exist that 
would make such an award unjust.”272 This discretion does not come 
from the text of the California fee-shifting provision, which simply 
provides, like North Carolina, that a court “may award court costs 
and reasonable attorney’s fees to the plaintiff . . . where it is found 
that a legislative body of the local agency has violated” the Open 
Meetings law.273 Rather, California’s courts reason that the fee-
shifting provision was enacted “to encourage private enforcement 
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because lack of judicial interpretation hampered the act’s 
effectiveness and penalties for noncompliance would otherwise be 
inadequate.”274 A California court will not award fees where it would 
be unjust to do so, but the “burden of showing such inequity [rests] on 
the defendant.”275 While North Carolina’s fee-shifting provision does 
not share California’s legislative history, it would be understandable 
for a North Carolina appellate court to limit the discretion of a trial 
court in denying attorney’s fees on the basis that doing so will serve 
the underlying policy of the Open Meetings law “that the hearings, 
deliberations, and actions of [public] bodies be conducted openly.”276 
If there is a lesson for North Carolina courts to glean from these 
jurisdictions, it is that they will do best to make their discretionary 
findings in writing on the record with reasoning included. This avoids 
the criticism that a court acted in a conclusory fashion or abused its 
discretion by outright denying attorney’s fees without giving the issue 
proper consideration. 
F. Plaintiffs in North Carolina Open Meetings litigation should 
engage in a risk-reward analysis on fee awards before filing suit. 
In the Open Meetings context, a defendant has no control over 
what issues are litigated. This is because the only proper defendant in 
an Open Meetings lawsuit is a “public body.”277 Using the merits test 
and looking to persuasive law from other jurisdictions, North 
Carolina courts will ask whether a plaintiff or defendant succeeded on 
significant issues in litigation when determining whether they 
prevailed and are therefore eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.278 
Therefore, which party prevails will be determined by the resolution 
of the issues that the plaintiffs choose to present to the court. 
If a plaintiff has a number of potential Open Meetings claims 
against a public body, it should consider how likely it is to succeed on 
each individual claim before filing suit. A party who brought forward 
only its strongest claims will be more likely to be considered 
prevailing by a court, given that a small amount of stronger claims will 
give the plaintiff a greater chance of achieving a “significant success” 
 
 274. L.A. Times Commc’ns, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 784 (quoting Common Cause v. Stirling, 174 
Cal. Rptr. 200, 202–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 275. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. L.A. Exp. Terminal, Inc., 81 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 456, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Common Cause v. Stirling, 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 200, 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 276. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2017). 
 277. Id. § 143-318.10(b). 
 278. See H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 
58, 468 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1996). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018) 
2018] FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS 1767 
on the “primary legal question in its cause of action.”279 This will 
further put the plaintiff in a better position to receive attorney’s fees 
were the court to examine “the benefits sought by the plaintiffs in the 
complaint versus those actually obtained by settlement.”280 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina’s fee-shifting provisions have been the subject of 
limited judicial interpretation. However, there is still room to make 
observations and predictions about how courts have, and may, treat 
these provisions. 
Between the Public Records and Open Meetings laws, the Open 
Meetings provision is the more predictable of the two. This is because 
North Carolina courts have demonstrated a willingness to borrow the 
principles of “prevailing party” jurisprudence from more well-
established bodies of persuasive law, like that of the Fourth Circuit, 
rather than craft tests that are specific to North Carolina. While it is 
theoretically possible that this trend could change in the future, there 
is no reason right now to think that it will. Litigants and courts in 
Open Meetings fee disputes will likely, therefore, continue to apply 
broadly accepted principles in the specific context of their dispute 
with little room to make novel legal arguments. 
However, the Public Records provision is a different story. On 
the plaintiffs’ side, the “substantially prevails” language of section 
132-9(c) is ripe for judicial interpretation. Even taking into account 
the persuasive landscape, it is far from certain how North Carolina’s 
appellate courts will treat this language when the time comes. The 
two most likely possibilities are that these courts will either (1) adopt 
the “catalyst” framework used in the federal FOIA context or (2) opt 
for a more defendant-friendly standard like that of Texas. The Texas 
option is bolstered by the fact that the North Carolina and Texas 
statutes are almost identical. However, North Carolina courts are by 
no means bound to follow the Texas courts’ interpretation of identical 
language. Indeed, the policy disputes that have arisen in Texas 
surrounding this defendant-friendly standard could cause North 
Carolina courts to think twice before following suit. 
As far as the defendants’ fee provision of the NCPRA is 
concerned, the law does have the benefit of treatment from at least 
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one court––albeit a federal district court with no binding authority.281 
That decision should at least serve as a warning to plaintiffs who 
either (1) have already received the disputed records and are 
considering filing a Public Records lawsuit as a punitive measure or 
(2) are seeking to quickly file suit against a defendant that has not 
acted as swiftly as the plaintiff might like. This is not to say that a 
plaintiff could not successfully enforce the NCPRA’s mandate that a 
defendant produce records “as promptly as possible.”282 Rather, this 
simply means that a plaintiff who jumps to file a Public Records 
lawsuit only a matter of days after making their requests risks being 
found to have filed suit in bad faith or on a frivolous basis. 
Ultimately, the best way for these provisions to be more 
precisely defined is through further treatment by appellate courts. 
This can only occur as more litigation reaches the appellate level, as a 
North Carolina court will not issue a “purely advisory opinion which 
the parties might, so to speak, put on ice to be used if and when 
occasion might arise.”283 Unless and until such further litigation 
occurs, courts and practitioners will have to look to other jurisdictions 
for guidance on how they should treat these provisions. 
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